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A Cuban Claims-Settlement Agreement: The Case from History  
On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced a significant policy shift 
concerning American-Cuban relations, pivoting toward normalizing relations with 
the country.1 Naturally, normalization will require lifting the U.S. trade embargo, 
but lifting the embargo may not even be legal until outstanding claims held by 
Americans are resolved against the Cuban government.2 During the Castro 
Revolution, the newly formed Cuban government, expropriated hundreds of 
American assets, resulting in thousands of claims. In 1964, Congress directed the 
U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), a division of the Justice 
Department, to determine the validity and value of these claims. After six years of 
proceedings, the Commission verified nearly 6,000 claims totaling $1.7 billion. With 
interest, these claims are now worth roughly $7 billion.3 Thus, as relations between 
these countries continue to thaw, resolving these claims will become an increasingly 
pressing priority.  
                                                
1 See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-
changes-0 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  
2 See Jacob Gershman, Obama’s Cuba Shift Puts Spotlight on Firms’ Asset Claims 
 (Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/12/22/obamas-cuba-
shift-puts-spotlight-on-firms-asset-claims/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  
3 See David Glovin and Toluse Olorunnipa, Cuba Property Claims, Yielding Pennies, May 
Spur Talks (Bloomberg, Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-23/cuba-
seized-property-claims-seen-as-yielding-pennies-on-dollar.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  
There is a long history of agreements signed with foreign countries to resolve 
bilateral claims.4 In the twentieth century, this tradition includes recognition of the 
Soviet Union and resolving the hostage crisis in Iran, in addition to many other less 
high-profile agreements. Agreements with the Soviet Union and Iran were subject 
to intense constitutional scrutiny—Presidents stretched their Article II powers to 
the limits, but the Supreme Court has yet to strike one of these agreements.5 This 
paper takes for granted the constitutional basis for signing such an agreement. 
Rather, the primary inquiry here is one of analogy: using prior agreements as 
models, what is the possibility or likelihood of a large-scale agreement with Cuba?  
This paper finds that any resolution of claims against the Cuban government 
will turn on political factors, largely controlled by Congress. Past agreements have 
been concluded swiftly, and relations with Cuba share many features of these past 
agreements. These past agreements, however, largely involved sole executive 
action—which can only go so far with Cuba, given statutory restrictions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I discusses historical claims-settlement 
agreements, focusing on the Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union and the 
Algiers Accords with Iran. Part II discusses modern claims-settlement regimes but 
                                                
4 See Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Constitutional 
Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 155, 156,168 (1985) (noting 
the President had exercised this authority as early as 1793 with Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson and further calling the power “generally uncontroversial”).  
5 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 
U.S. 396, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2003); G. Edward White, The Transformation 
of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1999). Accordingly, this 
paper treats as well settled the constitutional basis for signing such an agreement. Rather, 
the primary inquiry here is one of analogy: How would a Cuban claims-settlement 
agreement compare with past claims-settlement regimes?  
finds little favorable analogical evidence for Cuban negotiations. Part III takes 
these past examples and attempts to translate them to a prospective agreement 
with Cuba, injecting first-hand interviews with Cuban officials, academics, and 
members of the Cuban judiciary.  
I. Historical Claims Settlement Agreements  
A. Litvinov Agreement 
In the early 1930s, the Roosevelt Administration concluded the Litvinov 
Agreement with the Soviet Union, easing tensions between the two nations dating 
back to the Bolshevik Revolution.6 The parties’ ambitions for the Agreement were 
impressive. Of prime importance, they sought to collect Soviet debts owed to 
American citizens,7 obtain American political recognition of the Soviet state, and 
release Soviet claims against the United States arising out of American assistance 
for the White Armies.8  
The Agreement was one of the first major actions of the Roosevelt 
Administration and negotiations were begun in October 1933 at its behest—
President Roosevelt wrote to Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin suggesting the two 
                                                
6 During World War I, when the United States sent troops to Russia to aid the “White 
Armies” in efforts to displace the Bolsheviks following the October Revolution. 
7 For a discussion of the nature of the Soviet debts, totaling over $336 million (1933 
dollars), see Donald G. Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American View 140–
78 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1965).  
8 For a discussion of the Soviet claims, including over $5 million in bank deposits and $3 
million in claims against American corporations, see id. at 179–98. See also John N. 
Hazard, Book Review, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American View, 60 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 419, 419 (1966) (detailing the diplomatic efforts and further noting that the 
Agreement sough to construct an American embassy building in the Soviet Union, exchange 
American dollars for Soviet rubles at “reasonable rates,” and sever the link between the 
Soviet Government and the American Communist Party). 
countries begin “frank friendly conversations” to resolve their differences.9 
Remarkably, President Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim 
Litvinov concluded correspondence just over a month later—they had architected a 
deal that included significant Soviet concessions, including releasing and assigning 
to the United States all American judgments (and potential judgments) in favor of 
the Russian government from American nationals,10 a Soviet promise to not pursue 
claims against the United States for damages arising out of American support for 
the White Armies before 1920, as well as official American diplomatic recognition of 
the Soviet government.11 
The Senate did not ratify the Agreement—rather, it was “simply [ ] an 
exchange of diplomatic correspondence.”12 This is not surprising, given the 
“continued . . . opposition” in Congress to recognizing the Soviet government and an 
entrenched policy established in 1917 during the Wilson Administration by then-
                                                
9 See Chandler P. Anderson, Recognition of Russia, 28 Am. J. Int’l L. 90, 95 (1934) (quoting 
an October 10, 1933 letter from Roosevelt to Kalinin). See also id. at 90–95 (discussing a 
thaw in relations in the late 1920s).  
10 That is, the Soviet government pledged to release claims of the previous government 
against Americans and pledged to decline to enforce any claims the previous government 
might have had against Americans.  
11 The full text of the agreement is available in 28 Am. J. Intl’l L. 1, 1–11 (Supp. 1934). See 
also White, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 97 (cited in note 5) (claiming these Soviet concessions were 
“significant”). 
12 White, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 5). See also U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
(requiring the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate to “make Treaties”); Curtis A. Bradley 
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 367–91 (Wolters Kluwer 5th Ed. 2014) 
(discussing the different types of executive agreements, including the “sole executive 
agreement” signed in 1933); Note, Executive Agreements and the Treaty Power, 42 Colum. L. 
Rev. 831, 836–37 (1942) (noting that judicial authority for the agreements’ validity was 
“meagre [sp]”).  
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to refuse the “Bolshevik regime in Russia.”13 
That said, President Roosevelt did have constitutional authority to conclude the 
agreement, as the Supreme Court subsequently upheld in both United States v. 
Belmont and United States v. Pink. Thus, given external political pressure and 
opposition, it was arguably solely as a result of President Roosevelt’s personal 
determination to conclude an agreement with the Soviets that the Litvinov 
Agreement was signed.  
B. Algiers Accords 
The events surrounding the Algiers Accords have all the elements of a 
Hollywood blockbuster—diplomatic hostages, held in the wake of a foreign 
revolution, a failed rescue attempt by the American military, and fever-pitched 
political intrigue in the United States.14 These much more exciting circumstances 
begot a much more technical agreement between the United States and Iran.  
The Accords consisted of two Declarations15—the first (commonly known as 
the “General Declaration”), provided for the release of American hostages in 
exchange for the United States’ transfer of Iranian assets frozen in the United 
States. The second Declaration (commonly known as the “Claims Settlement 
Agreement”) established the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was 
                                                
13 The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition, in E.C. Buehler, B.W. Maxwell, and R.R. 
Pflaum, eds., Selected Articles on Recognition of Soviet Russia 238, 239–40 (1931); White, 85 
Va. L. Rev. at 77, 97 (cited in note XX).  
14 Indeed, this course of events was the subject of a Hollywood blockbuster. See Argo 
(Warner Bros. Pictures, 2012).  
15 The Declarations themselves were issued by the government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria on January 19, 1981. The Algerian government brokered the 
talks in Algiers—thus the name.  
afforded exclusive jurisdiction over “claims of nationals in the United States against 
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States,” including related 
counterclaims, arising out of “debts, contracts, . . . expropriations or other measures 
affecting property rights,” as well as over official claims of the United States and 
Iran against each other “arising out of contractual arrangements between them for 
the purchase and sale of goods and services.”16  
Contrasting with the Litvinov Agreement, the Accords were borne out of 
political expediency. From 1941–1979, the United States was a supporter of the 
“Shah” of Iran (that is, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi), whose reign ended with a 
revolution and his abdication. After the revolution, American interests were subject 
to widespread nationalization, expropriation, intervention, and termination of 
contractual arrangements. The situation escalated, however, when President Carter 
admitted the Shah to the United States for cancer treatment—in response, roughly 
3,000 Iranian students swarmed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 63 
Americans hostage.17 The American reaction was swift and market driven: over $12 
billion in Iranian assets and claims in the United States were frozen—both private- 
                                                
16 Algiers Accords, Art. II, § 1; Art. II, § 2. For a broad overview of the Accords, see Monroe 
Leigh, Jurisdiction—Corporate Nationality, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 642, 642 n. a1 (1983). For a 
discussion of the Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its initial constitutive elements, see 
Charles N. Brower and Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 26–
124 (Martinus Nijhoff 1998); David D. Caron and John R. Cook, Getting Started, in David 
D. Caron and John R. Cook, eds., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Process 
of International Claims Resolution: A Study by the Panel on State Responsibility of the 
American Society of International Law 11–18 (Transnational Publishers 2000).  
17 See Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lawrence W. 
Newman, and John M. Walker, Jr., eds., Revolutionary Days: The Iran Hostage Crisis and 
the Hague Claims Tribunal—A Look Back 5–7 (Juris Publishing 1999).  
and government-owned property—a freeze whose scope was “unprecedented.”18 The 
American hostages were held for 444 days, released with the Accords’ signature in 
1981.  
As with the Litvinov Agreement, the Algiers Accords were a sole executive 
agreement—they were not blessed by Congress.19 President Carter’s actions to 
freeze Iranian claims were rooted in express statutory authorization,20 but his 
authority to suspend claims in American courts was less clear. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Accords’ suspension of claims, looking to a “looser sense” 
of congressional acceptance of a “broad scope for executive action” to conclude such 
international agreements.21  
Thus, political expediency and a “general tenor” of Congressional acceptance 
led to resolving billions of dollars in claims and establishing an independent 
tribunal of unprecedented scope—furnishing hope and a potential model for 
negotiations with Cuba.  
                                                
18 Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze Iranian Assets, in Lowenfeld, Newman, and 
Walker, Revolutionary Days 11 (discussing the long history of complex banking and 
commercial relations between the two countries that made the freeze unlike prior similar 
actions against Cuba, North Korea, and China). See also id. at 19 (discussing the “sub rosa, 
economic mini-war,” in which Iranians attempted to wage a boycott of the dollar, while the 
United States encouraged other countries to deny Iran the use of non-dollar facilities); id. at 
20–21 (claiming the State Department was fairly uncertain about the scope of the asset 
seizure until late-January 1981).  
19 See supra note 9 [XX]. 
20 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–70 (approvingly citing the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) § 203, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)).  
21 The Supreme Court in Dames & Moore found neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act, 22 
U.S.C. § 1732 afforded the President express statutory authority to suspend foreign claims 
in American courts, but together, they informed a “general tenor of Congress’ legislation in 
[the] area,” such that the President was acting with “the acceptance of” Congress. Id. at 
677–78.   
II. Modern Claims-Settlement Regimes  
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), established in 1954, is a 
“quasi-judicial, independent agency” within the U.S. Department of Justice and 
adjudicates the claims of U.S. nationals against foreign citizens.22 The FCSC has 
jurisdiction to settle claims when Congress so delegates, pursuant to an 
international agreement, or at the request of the Secretary of State; and funds for 
FCSC awards are taken from congressional appropriations, international claims 
settlements, or the Department of Justice’s or Treasury’s liquidation of foreign 
assets in the United States.  
The FCSC and its precursor agencies have resolved 43 claims programs 
against various countries, totaling more than 660,000 claims and awards in the 
billions of dollars.23 Currently, the Commission has three active programs under 
agreements signed with Albania, Libya, and Iraq. Each is considered in turn as an 
example of current government practice that may be analogized to Cuba. 
                                                
22 See Anuj C. Desai and Sylvia M. Becker, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the 
United States: 2013 Annual Report at *1–3, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/annrep13.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015) 
(noting the FCSC assumed the functions of two prior agencies—the War Claims 
Commission and the International Claims Commission). See also International Claims 
Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq.; War Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2001–2017.  
23 See, e.g., Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S.: Completed Programs 
http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/completed-programs (last visited April 17, 2015) (listing 16 
recently completed programs).  
A. Albania 
The agreement with Albania was signed on March 10, 1995,24 settling claims 
between citizens of the United States and Albania levied against the respective 
foreign governments, arising out of military action taken at the end of World War 
II.25 Albania agreed to pay the United States $2 million, to be distributed by the 
FCSC, while the United States released gold due to Albania under reparations 
agreements concluding World War II.26  
The Albanian agreement provides evidence that even ossified legal 
positions—here, claims that were nearly 50 years old—are not immune from 
resolution under an international agreement.  
B. Libya 
Congress unanimously passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act,27 creating a 
$1.8 billion victim compensation fund for claims arising out of terrorist incidents in 
the 1980s blamed on Libya (though for which Libya did not accept responsibility), as 
                                                
24 For a text of the agreement, see Ronald J. Bettauer, Albania-United States: Agreement on 
the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues, 34 Int’l Legal Materials 
595, 597–99 (1995). See also Exec. Order No. 13,477, 74 Fed. Reg. 65965 (Oct. 31, 2008) 
(ordering settlement of claims); Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirirya, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109771.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015).  
25 U.S. citizen claims were largely based on expropriation and other loss of property to the 
Communist regime that seized power in Albania at the end of World War II.  
26 See Bettauer, 34 Int’l Legal Materials at 595. See also Sally J. Cummins, Digest of the 
United States Practice in International Law 502–03 (Oxford University Press 2008).  
27 A Bill to Resolve Pending Claims Against Libya by United States Nationals, and for 
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 110-301 (Aug. 4, 2008).  
well as compensation for Libyan victims of U.S. airstrikes in Tripoli and Benghazi 
in the 1980s.28  
As opposed to all other settlement agreements discussed above, the Libya 
claims settlement involved only tort claims—no contractual claims. Additionally, 
Congress and the President acted in perfect harmony—there was not a partisan 
element to the agreement. As such, the Libyan settlement is not likely to prove a 
useful analogy for Cuba.  
C. Iraq 
Similar to Libya, the Claims Settlement Agreement with Iraq was entered 
into to resolve tort claims of U.S. citizens and their families against Iraq for hostage 
taking and other injuries in violation of international law.29 Unlike the Libya 
agreement, however, the Iraq agreement was signed under the broad authority 
granted to the Secretary of State per the International Claims Settlement Act, 22 
U.S.C. § 1623(a)(1)(C), rather than an explicit grant from Congress. Indeed, there 
was no sharp statement from Congress, and despite “disbelief and anger” from the 
                                                
28 For a description of the claims settlement, see Libya pays $1.5 billion to settle terrorism 
claims (CNN, Nov. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/31/libya.payment/index.html?iref=topnews 
(last visited April 17, 2015). See also Royce C. Lamberth, The Role of Courts in Foreign 
Affairs, in John Norton Moore, ed., Foreign Affairs Litigation in United States Courts 10–12 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013).  
29 These claims are based in injuries from the First Gulf War, when hundreds of American 
soldiers were used as human shields. See Agreement between the United States of America 
and Iraq, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191781.pdf (last visited 
April 17, 2015); Letter from Mary E. McLeod to the Honorable Anuj C. Desai and Sylvia M. 
Becker (Oct. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/21/iraq_claims_second_
referral_10-7-2014.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015) (referring the claims to the FCSC and 
explaining the State Department’s categorization of pending claims).  
Iraqi people,30 the Iraqi claims settlement has proceeded without significant 
controversy.  
Thus, the Iraqi agreement, similar to the Libya agreement, does not appear 
to be a useful analogy to a prospective Cuban settlement.  
III. The Cuban Dilemma  
Settling the thousands of American claims against the Cuban government is 
not likely to happen soon, but it is (currently) a statutory requirement before the 
embargo may be lifted.31 This Part discusses the primary barriers to reaching an 
agreement, including threshold issues, the main hurdles for the United States 
(political and statutory), the primary points of contention, and whether prior 
agreements furnish hope for a successful agreement with Cuba.  
A. Threshold Issues 
At this writing, U.S-Cuba relations are constantly evolving, lurching toward 
full normalization of relations. In late March 2015, Chief of the Political Section for 
the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba, Justin Davis, claimed that the current focus of 
negotiations would be removing Cuba from the United States’ list of State Sponsors 
of Terrorism.32 In mid-April, however, President Obama announced that he intends 
                                                
30 Nizar Latif and Phil Sands, Iraqis Outraged at Payout for US Victims of Saddam (Middle 
East Online, Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=41341 (last visited April 17, 2015).  
31 See 22 U.S.C. § 6067(d). As will be discussed, this statutory requirement may be 
unconstitutional as an impermissible restriction on the Executive’s power to recognize 
foreign countries. 
32 See U.S. Department of State: State Sponsors of Terrorism, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited April 17, 2015).  
to remove Cuba from this list.33 Of course, this presidential designation is not the 
end of the story—a joint resolution from the House and Senate could block the 
removal. Regardless, President Obama’s announcement is an indication that U.S.-
Cuba relations continue to evolve quickly.  
After removing it from the State Sponsors of Terrorism, the United States 
would require establishing a full diplomatic embassy in Cuba, as opposed to the 
current “Interest Section.” Though the interest section operates as a “de facto 
embassy,” normalizing relations would assuredly require the establishment of a full 
embassy. Again, however, this is likely to occur in the near future—Roberta 
Jacobson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
recently said embassies in each country could be open as early as mid-April.34 
B. Hurdles for the United States  
The most significant hurdles to a successful claims settlement agreement are 
political and statutory. Politically, congressional Republicans have vocally opposed 
any normalization of relations with Cuba—Senator Marco Rubio has characterized 
President Obama’s Cuba relations as a “concession to tyranny”; Senator Ted Cruz 
claimed President Obama has “made [relations] worse”; and Speaker of the House 
                                                
33 Randal C. Archibold and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Cuba to Be Removed from U.S. List of 
Nations that Sponsor Terrorism (N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/americas/obama-cuba-remove-from-state-terror-
list.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Cuba’s place on the list has recently 
emerged as a “sticking point in negotiations” to normalize relations).  
34 Serena Marshall and Jim Avila, Cuba and US a Step Closer to Reopening Embassies 
(ABC News, Feb. 27, 2015), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/cuba-us-step-
closer-reopening-embassies/story?id=29285150 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
John Boehner criticized the turn of relations as deeply “misguided.”35 Indeed, 
Republicans have pledged to deny funds to reopen the embassy in Havana, stall the 
nomination of an ambassador, and “ignore” White House requests to lift the 
embargo.36 
Statutory obstacles are even more ominous.37 Before allowing a normalization 
of relations, the Helms-Burton Act38 requires the President to determine, inter alia, 
that the Cuban government is democratically elected under “free and fair” elections, 
the government shows “respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights” of 
Cuban citizens, the government is “substantially moving toward a market-oriented 
economic system based on the right to own and enjoy property,” and the government 
has made “demonstrable progress” to establishing an independent judiciary.”39 
Though the President could, ostensibly, act by executive action in affirming these 
requirements, it would certainly not be in good faith, as Political Section Chief 
Justin Davis noted in an interview. On the other hand, Congress could amend 
                                                
35 Sean Sullivan and Ed O’Keefe, GOP Lawmakers Blast Obama’s Cuba Policy Shift 
(Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2014/12/17/cuba-deal-reaction-sharply-split-on-capitol-hill/ (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015).  
36 Lauren French, How Republicans Could Stop Obama’s Cuba Play (Politico, Dec. 18, 
2014), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/congress-cuba-reaction-
113654.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). But see Deb Riechmann, Despite Pushback from 
Lawmakers, There’s Little Chance Congress can Stop Cuba Policy (PBS Newshour, Dec. 18, 
2014), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/despite-pushback-lawmakers-
theres-little-chance-congress-can-stop-cuba-policy/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
37 Cf. Litvinov Agreement, which was concluded without any statutory restriction.  
38 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091.  
39 22 U.S.C. § 6066. See also 22 U.S.C. §§ 6063, 6065. But see Peter Schroeder, Can Obama 
Lift Cuba Embargo Alone? (The Hill, Dec. 17, 2014), available at 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/227442-can-obama-lift-cuba-embargo-without-congress 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting a litany of actions that President Obama may take 
without congressional approval to “chip away” at the embargo).  
Helms-Burton to remove these statutory requirements. Indeed, Republican Senator 
Jeff Flake purportedly supports such an action.40  
C. Primary Points of Contention 
Any claims settlement with Cuba will inevitably involve competing 
valuations of two aggregate values: American citizens’ claims against the Cuban 
government for expropriated property and Cuban claims for damage to the Cuban 
economy as a result of the United States’ economic embargo. Indeed, Former Cuban 
Supreme Court Justice, Elpidio Pérez Suàres calls this “one of our most complicated 
problems.” This is further complicated by the fact that in the late 1950s, Cuba 
attempted to pay to settle claims with an increased sugar quota, but President 
Eisenhower cut the sugar quota, in a first step toward what would become a full 
embargo.41 For Cuba, this action represented an arbitrary decision by the United 
States that Cuba could not pay to settle American claims, and was effectively an 
American decision to walk away from the bargaining table, when Cuba was ready 
and willing to resolve the countries’ disputes.42 Thus, from a Cuban perspective, the 
United States would need to explain its prior malcontent to overcome Cuban 
skepticism.  
                                                
40 See Letter from Senators Jeff Flake and Paul Ryan to President Barack Obama (Jan. 28, 
2015), available at http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7b4ccf5c-54eb-4e20-a2b1-
9b9f27cfe90f/01.28.2015-flake-paul-gop-coalition-letter-on-us-cuba-reform.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015).  
41 Proclamation No. 3355, 74 Stat. C72 (1960).  
42 In separate personal interviews, Vladimir Falcón, representative for the Cuban Institute 
for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), and Former Justice Suàres independently 
confirmed this finding.  
Next, the baseline value of claims is complicated by multiple developments. 
First, as Former Justice Suàres noted, several claims against Cuba have already 
been presented to an American tribunal, with a judgment executed against Cuba—
despite the fact that Cuba denies that any American tribunal would have 
jurisdiction to hear the claim. These judgments, which Cuba considers void as a 
threshold issue, would need to be offset or reclaimed in order to pursue any 
comprehensive claims-settlement program. Second, as Representative Falcón 
explained, there is the issue of Cubans whose property was seized by the Castro 
government during the Revolution, who did not initially come to the United States 
but have emigrated sometime after 1960. Would their claims be included in the 
prospective agreement?43 Suàres calls these “calcification problems” that have 
arisen from the embargo’s extended duration.  
The next “sticking point” is the fact that the Cuban government views the 
American embargo as a violation of international law, and losses to the Cuban 
economy as a result of the embargo must be compensated.44 This could be a 
substantial sum, but even the Cuban government cannot decide how to calculate 
the extent of damages. Vice Foreign Minister Abelardo Moreno claims that at 
current prices, a conservative estimate of economic damages would be in excess of 
                                                
43 Former Justice Suàres posed a similar hypothetical, highlighting the case of Castillo Rum 
and its claims against the Cuban government. The owner and daughter of the company are 
Cuban, the family’s rum factory was nationalized, but the father has since passed away, 
never having emigrated to the United States. His daughter, however, has. Does the 
daughter inherit the father’s claim, now that she is present in the United States?  
44 Representative Falcón, of ICAP, for one, takes this view. See also generally Nigel D. 
White, The Cuban Embargo under International Law: El Bloqueo (Routledge 2014) (viewing 
the American embargo of Cuba as a “serious violation” of international law, and further 
claiming that the embargo undermines the use of sanctions around the world).  
$104 billion, but if one considers the devaluation of the U.S. dollar against the price 
of gold on international financial markets, damages reach nearly $1 trillion.45 This 
is a substantial discrepancy that will require resolution to come to a final 
agreement.  
D. Hope? Comparing to Other Settlement Agreements  
U.S.-Cuba relations have many features of prior agreements that suggest the 
parties will be able to reach a claims-settlement agreement, but there are also 
features that caution skepticism. This Section first examines aspects that favor an 
expeditious settlement, and then it examines aspects that disfavor an expeditious 
settlement.  
1. Favoring Settlement 
Executive Support. Clearly, the most ardent supporter of a Cuban settlement 
is President Obama. Just as President Roosevelt substantially expedited the 
Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union, President Obama’s initiative to change 
relations with Cuba will certainly expedite a claims-settlement agreement.  
Ossified Relations. At first blush, decades of frozen relations with Cuba would 
suggest negotiating a claims-settlement agreement would prove impossible. 
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Fortunately, history has not borne this out. The agreement with Albania was 
concluded after over fifty years, for one.46  
Negotiating with a Politically Averse Country. Dissenters to resetting 
relations with Cuba have disclaimed negotiating with a Communist state. 
Certainly, this would not be the first instance in which the United States has 
concluded an agreement with a country with politically averse interests. Both the 
Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords were signed with regimes that were 
much more adverse to the United States’ interests than is Cuba. Similarly, the 
agreement with Albania required negotiating with a Communist government.  
Presence of Hostages. President Obama’s December 2014 announcement was 
directly preceded with a hostage exchange between the United States and Cuba. 
Likewise, the Algiers Accords were expedited on account of American hostages in 
Tehran. The fact that hostages are no longer part of the equation with Cuba may 
work against an expeditious settlement, but that the United States has already 
concluded such a high-stakes agreement with Cuba provides evidence that further 
diplomatic agreements are foreseeable.   
2. Disfavoring Settlement 
Statutory Obstacles. No prior claims-settlement agreement has involved 
statutory restrictions—much less restrictions as stringent as those in the Helms-
Burton Act. Further, no other negotiation would have required congressional 
authorization of any sort. To be sure, the most significant agreements discussed 
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above—the Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords—were sole executive 
agreements. That is, Congress was entirely uninvolved with the negotiation process. 
As alluded to above, these statutory obstacles and requirement for congressional 
approval will likely prove to be the most substantial obstacle to a claims agreement 
with Cuba.  
Strong Political Lobby. A majority of congressional Republicans have vocally 
opposed any change in relations with Cuba, much less finalizing an claims-
settlement agreement with the country. This political opposition could prove fatal to 
success in reaching any agreement. Just as any ordinary statutory agreement may 
founder in Congress, any claims-agreement with Cuba must pass through Congress’ 
veto gates. The presence of a strong political lobby is also likely to cause a Cuban 
claims-settlement agreement to flounder, as congressional Republicans may erect 
numerous procedural gates to ever even voting on an agreement.  
Political Expediency (or Lack Thereof). One factor that suggests a claims-
settlement agreement is far from expected is the lack of political expediency. As 
opposed to both the Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords, the United States 
is not due to realize a substantial benefit from a claims-settlement agreement with 
Cuba. That is, there are no hostages to be released, and creditors with claims 
against the Cuban government are hardly clamoring for immediate relief. Indeed, 
there is a sizeable contingent of Cuban-Americans concentrated in Florida that are 
staunchly opposed to normalizing relations with Cuba, including resolving claims.  
Conclusion 
Historical precedent provides a wealth of examples of instances in which the 
United States has successfully concluded a large-scale claims-settlement agreement 
with a foreign government. Of course, relations with Cuba are unique in many 
ways—not to mention the statutory framework and restrictions imposed by the 
Helms-Burton Act. Regardless, certain aspects of this agreement that may 
otherwise suggest an agreement would be impossible have actually been 
encountered—and successfully overcome—in past negotiations.  
